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1. Introduction
1 In  his  last  decades,  Hilary  Putnam  spent  much  effort  criticizing  the  fact/value
dichotomy, the idea that while facts are understood as objective worldly entities, values
are  deemed as  subjective  or  intersubjective  projections.  According  to  Putnam,  this
dichotomy is the main source of subjectivism about value. Against this view, Putnam
has developed a battery of arguments partially drawn from a pragmatist legacy devoted
to discrediting what he viewed as the empiricist misconceptions at the heart of the
dichotomic approach. Willard van Orman Quine’s criticism of the analytic/synthetic
distinction  plays  a  relevant  role  in  the  overall  structure  of  Putnam’s  arguments.
According to Quine, we cannot sharply distinguish between analytic statements – those
that can be true or false based only on the meanings of the words involved, like “vixens
are female foxes” – and synthetic statements – those that can be true or false also on
the basis of the relevant empirical facts, like “the frog is on the log.” If Quine is right
and we cannot isolate these types of statements in a satisfactory way, we find ourselves
with  the  consequence  that  we  cannot  anymore  sharply  isolate  factual  statements;
factual and conceptual statements become intertwined and not easily untangled (Quine
1951; Putnam 2002: 2). This criticism entails the blurring of a distinction between what
is “empirical” and what is “conceptual.” The category of purely factual statements is
thus  implicitly  put  into  question.  Not  surprisingly,  according  to  Putnam  this  has
powerful entailments for the putative arguments in favor of the fact/value dichotomy,
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as it involves a basic problem in our understanding of facts and factual statements, so
that  there  is  a  basic  difficulty  in  isolating  facts.  From  this  premise,  important
consequences follow.
2 First, such arguments rely heavily on understandings of central concepts like “fact,”
“value,”  “convention,”  “description,”  and “evaluation.”  If  Quine’s  criticism is  right,
then  we  must  understand  these  concepts  differently.  With  convincing  examples,
Putnam showed how these concepts are all strongly interrelated and that dichotomic
readings, notwithstanding a widespread and commonsensical presence in the current
cultural scene, are ultimately flawed and untenable (Putnam 2002, chap. 2). 
3 Another argument of Putnam’s relies on examples taken from the history of science, in
which  the  contribution  of  epistemic  values  is  undeniably  relevant  in  determining
scientific  facts:  if  epistemic  values  play  a  role  in  shaping  the  basic  facts,  then
(epistemic) values and facts cannot be separated to the effect that in order to get facts
we need values (Putnam 2002: 30-4, 132, 141-3). Hence, according to Putnam, the very
notion of fact presupposes and embeds evaluative features and dynamics.
4 This view was presented by Putnam in the years when he defended internal realism,
the idea that our knowledge of reality is somehow filtered, in a Kantian fashion, by our
conceptual  schemes.  This  directly  entails  some  legitimate  role  for  values  in  our
knowledge of facts, as values are connected with our conceptual schemes (see below).
Hence, internal realism offers favorable terrain to develop such a view against the fact/
value dichotomy. Yet, Putnam also continued defending the collapse of the dichotomy
after his transition to a further epistemological phase: natural realism, the idea that
realism is basically aligned with common sense and that our contact with the world is
naturally direct and hence not mediated by conceptual schemes or sense data. This
view contains a naïve realist understanding of perception, according to which objects
and portions of  reality are “directly present” in perceptual  episodes (Putnam 1999:
10-1).
5 A major change in this epistemological transition concerns the concept of truth. After
the early  epistemic conception understood as  “idealized rational  acceptability,”  the
basis  of  the  internal  realist  phase,  Putnam  developed  a  personal  route  to  “alethic
pluralism,” roughly the idea that the truth predicate plays a different functional role
for  different  discourse  areas  (Putnam  1999:  64-70).  For  example,  truth  is
“correspondence”  in  the  case  of  empirical  statements,  but  it  is  “warranted
assertibility” in the case of ethical or aesthetic judgments. 
6 This  view,  at  least  prima  facie,  raises  an  issue  for  Putnam’s  perspective  on  the
dichotomy: these discourse domains, which are useful to define the roles played by the
truth predicate, seem to be a forbidden step for him in view of his arguments against
the fact/value dichotomy. If facts and values are as tangled as Putnam says, it is not
clear how he can afford distinctions of discourse domains that intuitively rely on such a
dichotomy between facts and values. If there is an effective collapse of the dichotomy, a
factual domain would comprise values and valuations as well. This consequence would
hinder the possibility of  reading “true” in terms of  “correspondence” for empirical
statements, for instance, as values would be embedded into facts and also understood
in terms of correspondence. However, if “correspondence” is acceptable both for facts
and values,  then it  is  not  clear  why there is  a  need for  alethic  pluralism –  a  view
motivated also  by  the  possibility  of  accepting “correspondence”  for  empirical  facts
without endorsing it for value judgments. Hence, a closer inspection is due.
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7 In  what  follows,  Section 2  summarizes  Putnam’s  arguments  against  the  fact/value
dichotomy.  Section 3  addresses  the  transition  from internal  to  natural  realism and
alethic pluralism. Here, we find the first incompatibility between alethic pluralism and
the abandonment of the fact/value dichotomy. Section 4 explores in more depth this
putative incompatibility by looking more closely at Putnam’s alethic pluralism. As a
matter of fact, Putnam endorses genuine distinctions of “discourse areas” or “language
games”  in  order  to  explain  his  pluralist  views.  Section 5  reexamines  Putnam’s
arguments in view of a more precise take on his alethic pluralism, providing a better
assessment  of  the  putative  incompatibility  between alethic  pluralism and the  fact/
value dichotomy: if the fact/value dichotomy collapses, then he cannot afford a tenable
distinction between factual  and nonfactual  discourse domains.  Furthermore,  to also
reinterpret this view by accepting the entanglement of fact and value together with the
idea that this is how empirical statements correspond entails further complications.
Section 6 therefore concludes the article by briefly restating the main points of this
incompatibility.
 
2. Against the Fact/Value Dichotomy
8 Putnam started criticizing the fact/value dichotomy in the period of his endorsement
of internal realism, the idea that truth is epistemic – he understood it as “idealized
rational acceptability”1 – and that reality is accessed cognitively by means of certain
conceptual  schemes.  This  epistemological  perspective  was  especially  congenial  for
criticizing  the  dichotomy,  since  values  here  belong  to  the  conceptual  frameworks
which are responsible for the very identification of what counts as facts: “[a] being with
no values would have no facts either” (Putnam 1981: 201). According to Putnam, values
are embedded into conceptual schemes, and choices among schemes presuppose and
involve values: “any choice of conceptual scheme presupposes values, and the choice of
a scheme for describing ordinary interpersonal relations and social facts […] involves,
among other things, one’s moral values” (ibid.: 215).
9 Thus, the activities involved in describing and evaluating belong to the same enterprise
and cannot easily be detached and isolated in the analysis. If description and evaluation
are intertwined and the concepts of  “facts,” “values,” and “conventions” cannot be
sharply separated, then facts depend on our values and conventions (Putnam 2002: 4).
This can be paraphrased by stating that facts depend in an important sense on our
conceptual  framework,  thus  endorsing  internal  realism  across  the  board.2 In  an
important  sense,  the  facts  studied  by  science  presuppose  a  great  deal  of  epistemic
values such as “coherence,” “reasonableness,” “plausibility,” “simplicity,” “elegance,”
and  so  forth  (Putnam  2002:  30-4,  141-3).  Hence,  concludes  Putnam,  the  idea  of
detaching values and facts is irremediably flawed.
10 However, Putnam’s epistemological views changed over time, leading him to abandon
internal realism and to endorse what he called “natural” realism, which he deemed
much closer to common sense.3 This view against internal realism rejects the idea that
conceptual schemes play the role of epistemic intermediaries between mind and world.
Natural  realism rejects  also  the “verificationist  semantics”  presupposed by internal
realism: it was the idea that the meaning of a generic statement S can be understood in
terms of its use by looking at its circumstances of verification CV, and that there is a
tight  connection  between  meaning  and  understanding.4 Furthermore,  perception,
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according  to  this  new  approach,  directly  discloses  and  presents  a  world  to  our
experience, without the need of any epistemic intermediaries. Truth, finally, is now
understood as plural,  or,  to put it  differently,  as playing different roles in different
discourse domains (see below).
11 A recurrent theme in Putnam’s late philosophy is the tendency to avoid metaphysical
readings  of  philosophical  views.  For  example,  according  to  him,  we  should  avoid
crystalizing philosophical  distinctions  into  metaphysical  dualisms.  This  is  a  general
attitude that Putnam shows in this discussion: metaphysics tends to crystalize, and to
make  rigid,  concepts  and  categories  that  are  actually  “flexible”  in  ordinary  usage.
According to this point of view “[…] ordinary distinctions have ranges of application,
and we are  not  surprised if  they  do  not  always  apply”  (Putnam 2002:  11).  Putnam
affirms that such distinctions are often blurred in ordinary usage and that sometimes
the  intervention  of  philosophy  can  draw  lines  and  boundaries  where  this  is  not
necessary – and this perspective clearly revives an attitude once common in ordinary
language philosophy and in the later Wittgenstein. 
12 The criticism of the fact/value dichotomy is a case in point for this attitude: the fact
that we can trace relevant distinctions, also in this specific issue, does not necessitate
drawing metaphysical consequences from this possibility. We should resist the impulse
to understand distinctions as having a metaphysical import or as carving reality at its
joints. This becomes particularly relevant for the fact/value dichotomy: “[…] there is a
distinction to be drawn (one that is useful in some contexts) between ethical judgments
and other sorts of judgments. […] But nothing metaphysical follows from the existence of a
fact/value distinction in this (modest) sense” (Putnam 2002: 19). Thus, this is a practical and
intuitive distinction concerning what we do when we use ethical statements and what
we do when we use empirical statements, without any need to involve metaphysical
substantial differences between Facts and Values (capital letters stand, in a Rortyan
fashion, for the metaphysically loaded understanding of facts and values, in order to
distinguish the dichotomy from the merely conceptual distinction). Here we have clear
functional differences, accompanied by different ways to discuss these concepts, which
are embedded in our ordinary uses but without a relevant metaphysical significance
under the surface: “[f]acts remain distinct from values (when they do) because of the
way  we  treat  them  and  talk  about  them,  in  everyday  contexts  as  well  as  within
specialist discourse” (Marchetti & Marchetti 2017: 12). After the introduction of this
low-profile5 metaphysical  attitude  about  how  to  properly  handle  philosophical
distinctions, Putnam makes his main points concerning the intertwining of fact and
value – arguments that, as we saw, presuppose an acceptance of Quine’s criticism of the
analytic/synthetic distinction. 
13 Describing  and  evaluating  are  activities  that  we  perform  in  everyday  life,  and  we
should resist  the  temptation of  conceiving of  them as  separate  boxes,  without  any
overlaps. Description and evaluation can be distinct in terms of the functions enacted
by our thoughts and speech acts, but the presence of a description never automatically
rules out some evaluative aspect in it and vice versa. Conventional aspects of discursive
practices, furthermore, combine in relevant ways with what we do in describing and in
evaluating. The upshot is an image of ordinary practices where there is a constitutive
intertwining of descriptions, evaluations, and conventions, and in which this ensemble
hinders any unilateral metaphysical untangling (Putnam 2002: 4, 27, 39-40, 62, 103-4).
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This is the basis of what can be understood as an entanglement of fact and value, which
I call “the entanglement thesis.”
14 Another line of Putnam’s argument, already introduced, concerns the role of epistemic
values in actual science and in shaping the very facts. This argument must be read as
consistent with this low-profile metaphysical attitude, showing as it does that there is
an effective role of epistemic values in science, one that is relevant in shaping facts: but
this does not show any metaphysical significance about facts or epistemic values, as
there is only an undeniable and useful functional connection.
15 Finally, Putnam accuses Hume’s metaphysics of facts to be the actual theoretical basis
of the strong fact/value dichotomy (a view which deeply influenced Logical Positivism,
for instance); facts, according to Hume, can be stated by using the epistemic role of the
senses (ibid.: 14-22). This view is untenable, Putnam claims emphatically, as it would
disqualify as nonfactual much theoretical physics, at least all the theories that assign
explanatory import to theoretical entities (ibid.: 29). It is here with this Humean legacy,
according to Putnam, that the innocuous distinction between facts and values inherited
a metaphysically loaded understanding. 
16 These arguments – a) the role of (epistemic) values in science, b) the intertwining of
fact, value, and convention, and c) the scientific untenability of the Humean notion of
fact  (which  had  a  foundational  role  for  the  dichotomy)  –  must  be  understood  as
questioning  the  Fact/Value  Dichotomy  as  metaphysical.  This  means  that  Putnam
acknowledges a legitimacy to the fact/value (conceptual) distinction that he tries to
distinguish  from  its  metaphysical  interpretation  (the  Dichotomy).  This  means,  in
practice, that according to Putnam we do something different by stating facts and by
evaluating actions, for instance. 
 
3. Putnam’s Alethic Pluralism
17 As we already saw, in the 1990s Putnam abandoned internal realism and embraced the
view that he called “natural realism” (Putnam 1999). This epistemological transition
entailed an important change in the conception of truth he endorsed; after abandoning
the previous epistemic conception of truth as idealized rational acceptability,6 Putnam
adhered to  a  version of  alethic  pluralism,  the  view that  truth works  differently  in
various discourse domains. For example, we can rehabilitate a correspondence view
concerning  the  factual  domain  while  admitting  epistemic  conceptions  in  many
nonfactual domains such as ethics, aesthetics, and so forth (Wright 1992; Lynch 2009;
Pedersen & Wright 2013). This option in many versions is gaining consensus among
philosophers who see it as a valuable alternative to deflationary views, which affirm
that “true” is nothing more than an expressive disquotational device for generalization
and semantic ascent deprived of any explanatory or metaphysical import.7
18 Putnam  did  not  retract  his  criticisms  of  the  fact/value  dichotomy  during  his
epistemological and metaphysical transition from internal to natural realism. However,
while internal realism was the original epistemological ground for this view, natural
realism inherits this criticism rather automatically. He endorsed the compatibility of
these  views  as  a  non-problematic  transition;  one  can  fairly  say  that  this  attitude
belongs  to  his  endorsement  of  pragmatism during  his  internal  realist  phase  which
survives his transition toward natural realism. However, there are relevant questions
that  can be  raised  in  this  respect.  Some considerations  may undermine  at  least  in
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principle the compatibility between alethic pluralism and the criticism of the Fact/
Value Dichotomy. Alethic pluralism, for example, is established by the acknowledgment
of different discourse domains, the most relevant of which are those that are factual
and those that are nonfactual. Thus, “true” is understood in terms of “correspondence”
in sentences like “it is true that the frog is on the log,” which obviously belong to the
empirical domain and is understood in terms of “warranted assertibility” (or sibling
notions) in sentences like “it is true that the death penalty is wrong,” which obviously
belong  to  a  nonfactual  (in  this  case  ethical)  domain.  We  can  imagine  many  other
discourse  domains  and  consequent  changes  in  the  meaning  of  “true.”  Highly
intuitively,  this  view  has  the  interesting  and  promising  feature  of  relocating  old
counterexamples to traditional conceptions of truth in terms of domains: “it is true
that  the  death  penalty  is  wrong”  does  not  count  anymore  as  a  counterexample  to
“correspondence theories” because it belongs to a different (nonfactual) domain, but
correspondence works nicely for empirical sentences. This contextualization of “true”
in terms of domains neutralizes old counterexamples by emphasizing how they were
based upon the conflation of distinct discourse areas in which sentences when true are
true in different ways. However, despite this promising insight for traditional views on
truth, this alethic pluralist perspective faces an intuitive challenge, and one potentially
unpleasant for Putnam: 1) alethic pluralism requires distinguishing among discourse
domains;  and  2)  distinguishing  among  domains  seems  to  be  in  tension  with  the
criticisms to the Fact/Value Dichotomy, which can be interpreted also as a rejection of
the intuitive force of domains’ distinctions. 
19 The  problem,  which  is  straightforward,  is  the  following:  if  facts,  values,  and
conventions are intertwined with each other and inseparable, and if evaluations and
descriptions  are  likewise,  then  we  cannot  afford  a  useful  and  tenable  distinction
between factual and nonfactual domains. If we cannot afford such a distinction among
domains, we lose any sound grip on the very (intuitive) definition of alethic pluralism,
as it depends on taking such domains to be somewhat distinct; otherwise, it would not
be intuitive to think about truth as playing different roles in those contexts.8 Domains
are simply taken at face value – one would add that this is so “in ordinary usage.” At
the  very  least,  Putnam  would  need  a  version  of  alethic  pluralism  that  is  not
compromised with the distinction between factual and nonfactual domains.9 Why is
“true” understood in one way in “it is true that the frog is on the log” and in another
way in “it is true that the death penalty is wrong” if  we cannot afford an intuitive
distinction between the two domains as ruled out by Putnam’s arguments against the
Fact/Value Dichotomy, which would hinder factual domains as genuine? In fact, if the
Dichotomy is untenable the empirical domain turns out to be an “entanglement of fact
and value” which cannot be understood as “purely” factual.
20 A defender of Putnam’s view could be tempted to reply that this distinction of domains
should not be seen as metaphysically substantial, as if it would serve as a distinction of
ontological import. According to an attitude like this, we could think of such domains
as  distinctions  that  we  find  handy  in  ordinary  practice,  without  the  need  of
philosophical  principles  acting  under  the  surface.  We  also  noticed  that  this
“metaphysical interpretation” of the Fact/Value Dichotomy would leave the conceptual
distinction between fact and value on the table as legitimate. The legitimacy of this
distinction,  furthermore,  would  also  be  the  basis  to  argue  for  the  legitimacy  of
distinguishing factual and nonfactual domains, and so would be nicely compatible with
alethic pluralism. Hence, from this point of view mainly concerning the tenability of
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alethic  pluralism,  we  find  ourselves  facing  a  pressing  question:  If  the  fact/value
distinction is legitimate and consistent with the desired alethic pluralism, then why all
the  insistence  on  rejecting  the  (metaphysical)  Fact/Value  Dichotomy,  which  is
inconsistent with alethic pluralism? A fair reply is that rejecting the dichotomy is not
meant, at least at the beginning, to address any problems concerning truth. This is sure
enough, but do such commitments align on closer inspection?
21 One could say that such a rejection of the Dichotomy is not that effective, and if it were
effective in establishing that facts depend also on values (the entanglement thesis),
then we could not coherently exploit factual and nonfactual discourse domains in order
to  articulate  and  motivate  alethic  pluralism;  furthermore,  it  would  even  put  into
question the legitimacy of the conceptual distinction. If our statements enact forms of
entanglement between fact and value, then the distinction between facts and values
becomes an instrumental and pragmatic one; this is a distinction that may be helpful
for  certain  purposes,  but  it  is  not  involved  in  the  conceptual  role  of  “facts”  and
“values.”  Another  consequence  if  Putnam  was  right  on  the  Fact/Value  Dichotomy
would be the need to define and defend alethic pluralism without acknowledging the
legitimacy of the distinction among discourse domains or simply changing one’s theory
of truth. 
22 The point I am making here merely concerns an everyday life distinction about what
we do when we utter some sentences like “the frog is on the log” and others like “the
death penalty is wrong,” especially in the circumstances in which we say that these are
“true.” This is something that is acceptable legitimate in our ordinary experience, and I
am not loading it with unnecessary metaphysical baggage. Thus, tension remains if we
maintain  a  low-profile  metaphysical  attitude  concerned  with  everyday  usage;  we
usually distinguish between what we do with factual and nonfactual statements and
indeed  between  discourse  areas.  This  distinction  is  rather  in  question  with  the
refutation of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, which has an intuitive conceptual connection
with  the  distinctions  among  discourse  domains;  according  to  the  refutation  of  the
Dichotomy,  empirical  facts  would  usually  involve  values,  so  empirical  statements
cannot count as belonging to a proper factual domain. Therefore, we need to look more
closely at how alethic pluralism understands such domains and the ways in which they
can be said to be distinct. The present situation can be stated as a dilemma: we wish to
reject discourse domains, as effective and not just a façon de parler, when we think about
the Fact/Value Dichotomy, but we also wish to admit them when we think about the
many  uses  of  truth.  Granting  all  the  possible  flexibility  to  ordinary  usage,  here
something  clearly  must  be  rejected,  as  the  commitments  involved  are  not  easily
compatible with each other. This does not mean, however, that there is anything wrong
with rejecting the dichotomy or with endorsing alethic pluralism per se; these views
are  clearly  live  options  in  their  respective  fields.10 The  problem is  that  such views
apparently require being handled with special care when they are both endorsed as in
Putnam’s case.
23 Let  us  give  a  closer  look  to  how Putnam’s  alethic  pluralism understands  discourse
domains.
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4. Discourse Domains in Putnam’s Alethic Pluralism 
24 Discourse  domains  play  a  major  theoretical  role  for  the  standard understanding of
alethic  pluralism.  Popular  pluralist  proposals  such  as  Crispin  Wright’s  and Michael
Lynch’s all assign a relevant role to this distinction of domains.11 As Douglas Edwards
put it: “[i]ndeed, some commitment to the idea [of discourse domains] is ingrained in
the very motivations for  the view”;  furthermore,  “[i]f  this  idea is  given up,  then a
central motivation for the view is lost” (Edwards 2018: 85-6). Such statements mark a
kind of conceptual pervasiveness of discourse domains for alethic pluralism that serves
a  central  motivating  role.  However,  this  acknowledgment  is  not  enough  to
automatically attribute the view to Putnam. This issue requires closer examination.
25 Putnam sometimes says that his pluralist remarks on truth barely deserve to be called a
proper “theory,” and that are mostly features to consider when we talk about truth in
order  to  avoid  saying  things  like  “truth  is  correspondence,”12 “truth  is  warranted
assertibility,” “truth is coherence,” and so forth. With these remarks, noncommittal
and low-profile as they are, he says something that certainly may resemble an attitude
that is consistent with alethic pluralism. He mostly talks of “discourse areas” rather
than discourse domains, but this difference, on close inspection, simply amounts to a
terminological one (nothing in Putnam’s texts is evidence to the contrary). 
26 This is how Putnam characterizes the factual discourse area, which concerns empirical
facts: “[w]hen we confine attention to empirical statements, both correspondence and
disquotation are features of  truth” (Putnam 2012:  98).  Here,  “empirical  statements”
show up  as  a  discourse  area  in  which  we  talk  of  empirical  facts,  and  thus  can  be
understood as a category containing a certain type of statements clearly pointing to the
factual realm. Hence, Putnam continues, “‘true’ varies from language game to language
game” (ibid.). Here, language games play the role usually assigned to discourse domains,
certifying that Putnam is moving in this territory. However, the later Putnam is never
eager to talk about principles and categories. For instance, here he talks of “language
games” in a Wittgensteinian fashion, and this problematizes the proper attribution to
Putnam of a pluralist “theory” of truth.13 Concerning these intuitions as belonging or
not to a theory of truth, Putnam affirms that “[t]he difficulty in giving a picture of our
notion of truth (I doubt we can give anything that deserves the title of a “theory”) is to
do  justice  simultaneously  both  to  the  unity  of  the  notion,  and  the  plurality of  the
correctness-conditions that go with it and give it content” (Putnam 2012: 98).
27 Clearly,  Putnam is  distancing himself  from anything like  a  theory  of  truth,  but  he
remarks how different applications of the concept of truth have different “correctness-
conditions.”  This  means  that  discourse  areas  are  effective  in  distinguishing  such
conditions,  and  therefore  play  effective  roles  in  ordinary  discursive  practice.14
However, putting aside the issue of the aforementioned attribution of a “theory,” we
can also recognize some of the intuitions which are typical of alethic pluralism, like the
idea  of  doing  justice  “both  to  the  unity  of  the  notion,  and  the  plurality  of  the
correctness-conditions that go with it.” This is implicitly testified to by an intuitive
trust  in  distinguishing  between  empirical  and  ethical  statements,  and  an  intuitive
endorsement of the view that truth plays plural roles for different types of statements.
The basic idea underlying this approach is that “true” is correctly applied to different
statements in different ways; a unitary concept applies differently to many discourse
areas where statements are correct (and true) in different ways. Different discourse
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domains permit different uses of the truth predicate, and this is the pluralist core of
Putnam’s view as “different kinds of statement are responsible to reality in their own
way. This means that different uses of ‘true’ are allowed by different properties, and
these  are  all  genuine”  (Dell’Utri  2017:  19);  these  discourse  domains  permit  “an
extendable family of uses of the predicate ‘true’” (ibid.: 17).
28 After this brief summary of Putnam’s views on truth associated with alethic pluralism,
we can say that he based his ideas and insights on an intuitive distinction between
discourse domains. This attribution is therefore legitimate, and Putnam helped himself
with something like genuine notions of factual and nonfactual contexts even though he
did not understand them as a theory. Hence, our previous doubts are still on the table:
Does this endorsement of alethic pluralism based on acknowledging genuine factual
discourses become incompatible with rejecting the Fact/Value Dichotomy as denying
genuine factual discourses (the entanglement thesis)? 
 
5. Discourse Domains and the Arguments Against the
Fact/Value Dichotomy
29 Distinguishing factual from nonfactual domains intuitively requires that we have some
grasp of what it means to talk about empirical facts. It also requires that we have some
grasp of what it means to talk about things that do not necessarily entail describing
empirical facts, for example talking about ethical or aesthetic matters. When we loosely
talk of empirical or ethical discourse areas, we are implicitly distinguishing between a
context where we describe how things are and a context where we mostly evaluate
deeds rather than describe them. I assume these remarks as intuitive and loose – I am
not attaching a great deal of philosophical significance to them. However, if  I  must
choose a view or an attitude in order to give philosophical substance to these ways to
talk, the best account I can find is that of functionally “distinguishing what we do” by
talking of facts or by talking of values, for example. Such an approach can be found in
the work of authors like Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wilfrid Sellars, Simon Blackburn, Allan
Gibbard,  Robert  Brandom,  Paul  Horwich,  Huw  Price,  Michael  Williams,  and  many
others.15 Therefore, there are basically functional differences among these discourse
areas  or  vocabularies;  with  them  we  do  different  things.  Some  of  these  authors,
furthermore, endorse deflationary views on truth which can accommodate much better
the functional differentiations of the many discourse areas, since truth is understood as
insubstantial so that “it is true that the frog is on the log” can be true in the same
insubstantial way of “it is true that the death penalty is wrong.”16 At least prima facie,
this neopragmatist approach seems quite sound; however, this is merely how I would
frame the issue, so let us return to Putnam’s view.
30 The problem is whether Putnam is capable in view of his arguments against the Fact/
Value  Dichotomy  of  distinguishing  clearly  among  such  discourse  domains.  More
specifically, if facts systematically presuppose values (the entanglement thesis), are we
entitled  to  talk  about  a  “proper” factual  domain  (and  so  of  purely  empirical
statements)? If we cannot distinguish properly between “describing” and “evaluating,”
are we entitled to the corresponding discourse areas? If we are not, how can we use
them to define our plural uses of “true” and to say that in certain statements truth
works in terms of “correspondence” and in other statements in other ways?
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31 There is apparently something more explicit in Putnam’s words that seems to proceed
toward answering these questions. In particular, he seems to be somehow aware of the
implications of these views on truth for his rejection of the Fact/Value Dichotomy. An
eloquent  passage  is  the  following:  “[…]  by  the  way,  my rejection  of  the  fact/value
dichotomy doesn’t mean that there’s no use for a distinction between descriptions and
evaluations”  (Putnam  2012:  98).  Here,  Putnam  is  clearly  defending  an  ordinary
distinction between “descriptions” and “evaluations” and is also commenting that it is
not ruled out by rejecting the Fact/Value Dichotomy, even though more by fiat than by
argument. Hence, we have a clear statement of concern here about the compatibility
between rejecting the Fact/Value Dichotomy and endorsing some pluralist  views of
truth. I see this as revealing Putnam’s awareness of a potential issue as the quotation
above is  taken from a discussion about truth.  Naturally,  we can ask if  the intuitive
distinction between descriptions and evaluations suffices to distinguish discourse areas
legitimizing and motivating alethic pluralism. A first thing that is easily noticed is that
Putnam implicitly understands the differences among the many types of statements in
pragmatic terms by looking at what we do with them, and this is very close to the
neopragmatist and Wittgensteinian approaches that I mentioned above. 
32 This is, however, too soon to establish the point. When Putnam attacks the Fact/Value
Dichotomy  he  just  denies  this:  “‘Valuation’  and  ‘description’  are  interdependent”
(Putnam 2002: 77); “description and valuation can and must be entangled” (ibid.:  27).
Thus, he apparently claims that “valuation and description are interdependent and
entangled” when it is comfortable to him in order to attack the Fact/Value Dichotomy;
quite differently,  he also claims that  “[this]  doesn’t  mean that there’s  no use for  a
distinction between descriptions and evaluations” when it  is  comfortable to him in
order  to  defend  the  distinction between  discourse  areas  that  sustains  his  alethic
pluralism. 
33 Again,  Putnam could say that  in the former case he is  rejecting the (metaphysical)
Dichotomy and that in the latter case he is legitimizing the (conceptual) distinction.
Yet,  this  is  not  the  solution  since  it  would  make  the  criticism  of  the  Dichotomy
ineffective  in  affirming  that  facts  really  depend  on  values  and  hence  that  the
entanglement  thesis  would  not  bear  relevant  implications.  If  the  collapse  were
effective, meaning that we may understand facts and values as actually tangled, then
the fact/value distinction and the distinction between factual and nonfactual domains
would lose their intuitive strength for us. If this does not happen, then the collapse of
the  Dichotomy  does  not  play  a  relevant  philosophical  role,  but  only  denies  an
understanding of facts and values as distinct metaphysical substances. First, however,
in this case such a metaphysical understanding would be a sort of philosophical fetish,
an easy (and empty) target whose collapse bears no relevant consequences. The only
interesting consequence here would be that facts and values really are tangled (the
entanglement thesis) to the effect that we cannot distinguish between facts and values
(and between factual and nonfactual domains). If  these consequences do not follow,
though,  then  the  collapse/entanglement  does  not  possess  much  significance  and
becomes the mere criticism of an artefactual conceptual fetish – one that nobody, not
even Logical  Positivists,  defended.  If  there were really  a  collapse of  the Fact/Value
Dichotomy, this would entail a problem for the legitimacy of the distinction, too, and
this would also forbid admitting the legitimacy of domains based on the possibility of
talking about factual statements as genuine. In other terms, the present situation is one
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in which we put on our “ethical  glasses,” and as a consequence we do not see any
distinction between fact and value; we rather see them entangled. Vice-versa, when we
put  on our  “alethic  glasses”  we must  trace  that  distinction in  order  to  define  and
motivate  our  pluralist  perspective.  Distinguishing  between  facts  and  values  would
become an artificial operation enacted when needed in a context where fact and value
belong to the same entanglement.  Are we,  however,  allowed to say that  “empirical
statements” are “true” in terms of “correspondence with the facts” and that “value
judgments”  are  “true”  in  terms  of  “epistemic  conditions”  if  facts  and  values  are
“actually” tangled? Should we not say that truth is rather some correspondence for this
entanglement? Finally, would this not be mostly incompatible with alethic pluralism by
endorsing the correspondence view across the board? Let us push this reasoning a little
further.
34 This final way to read Putnam’s perspective is by denying that when we read the truth
predicate in terms of “correspondence,” it depends on the fact that the statement here
called true is solely (or entirely) empirical, meaning it is an entanglement of fact and
value. A corollary of this view would be that value judgments also comprise factual or
descriptive aspects. Putnam’s discussion of “thick ethical concepts” like “cruel,” which
are presented as playing both a descriptive and a valuative function, seems to be a case
in point for such a reading (Putnam 2002: 34-43; see also Bernstein 2005, and Rosiak-
Zięba  2018).  However,  if  we  admit  the  insertion  of  values  in  our  understanding  of
“empirical” statements, and that “truth” can be “correspondence” for such statements
(statements that correspond to an entanglement of fact and value), then to my mind
many unpleasant consequences follow: 
35 1) A placement problem for ethical vocabulary: since such an entanglement “corresponds”
to our statements, we embark on representationalism about values as well as about
facts, generating a “placement problem” for moral facts: Where then are moral facts
located in the natural  world? (Price 2011:  187).  By the way,  assuming also that the
standard understanding of empirical facts is not controversial, we can also ask: Would
not this entanglement also be a way to make empirical facts much more controversial
and muddier than they are usually taken to be? 
36 2)  Bad  metaphysics (all  over  again):  if  one  accepts  representationalism  about  moral
vocabulary and its consequences, it follows that one endorses a type of metaphysics of
(fact and) value that Putnam avoids by the very criticism of the Dichotomy. One could
say that by endorsing this kind of moral realism Putnam would avoid subjectivism,
which is his greatest foe here, yet at the price of reinstating the type of metaphysics
that he deemed responsible for the spreading of subjectivism.17 
37 3) Uselessness of alethic pluralism: if we can understand “truth” as “correspondence” for
the entanglement of fact and value, we lose the basic motivations to defend alethic
pluralism; this is precisely the view that we may adopt to save a “correspondence” view
for  the  empirical  realm  while  endorsing  epistemic  views  on  ethical  and  aesthetic
matters, for instance. Why should one endorse alethic pluralism at all if the point of
rejecting the dichotomy is to counter subjectivism and the main strategy for this is a
version of metaethical cognitivism in which truth can be “correspondence” in the case
of entanglement? 
38 Hence, combining a correspondence view and the entanglement thesis does not solve
our basic problem. 
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39 However,  we  can  admit  a  potential  final  defensive  move  for  the  theorist  that
nonetheless tries to endorse both truth pluralism and the entanglement thesis;  this
means  taking the  entanglement  at  face  value  and endorsing  it  when talking  about
values  (so  to  counter  subjectivism and noncognitivism) and drawing innocuous but
useful conceptual distinctions between facts and values and among discourse domains
when talking about truth (so to legitimize and endorse truth pluralism). This is perhaps
a  bit  cumbersome,  but  it  can  be  in  principle  feasible,  at  the  very  least  with  some
additional work. However, I see a problem here: it would entail understanding “the frog
is  on  the  log”  as  an  entanglement  when  one  is  not  concerned  with  truth  and
understanding it as an empirical statement when one is concerned with truth so that
the same statement is both empirical and “hybrid” depending on the context. Rather
than simply cumbersome, I deem this implausible.
40 Again, facts and values are tightly and clearly tangled with each other in the denial of
the  Dichotomy,  but  they  must  be  easily  and  conveniently  untangled  when  we
distinguish  discourse  areas  in  order  to  say  how  the  truth  predicate  behaves
contextually. This view undeniably involves some stretching of ideas and distinctions,
and again this can be one of the underlying motivations for Putnam’s reservations
about  calling  them  “theories”  and  for  his  metaphysical  low-profile  attitude.
Nevertheless, as far as I can see, Putnam should have pulled the feet from at least one
of those boots as these commitments hardly stand together. Either Putnam rejects the
Dichotomy  and  finds  another  way  to  defend  alethic  pluralism  (without  embracing
discourse  areas  at  face  value)18 or  he  accepts  the  Dichotomy  to  maintain  alethic
pluralism. Hence, at least one of these incompatible commitments must give way – but
again, this incompatibility entails no problems on the independent tenability of these
views.
41 Finally,  there  are  intelligible  reasons  why  Putnam  endorsed  this  argumentative
trajectory and never the other neopragmatist approach I sketched above. Putnam has
always been critical of the nonfactualist and noncognitivist views sometimes associated
with many neopragmatist options (especially Blackburn’s quasi-realism).19 This means
that  such views on distinguishing what  we do with different  statements  cannot  be
interpreted as being between a factual domain where we describe facts with empirical
statements  and  a  nonfactual  domain  where  we  express  our  attitudes  with  ethical 
statements,  for  instance.  The  noncognitivist  trajectory  drawn  by  this  expressivist
stance in metaethics marks a significant distance from Putnam’s cognitivist intuitions.
20 Furthermore,  the  neopragmatist  views  sketched  above  more  or  less  agree  on  a
deflationary  understanding  of  “true”  that  permits  successful  distinguishing  among
discourse domains only in terms of the different functions enacted (e.g.,  describing,
evaluating, and so forth). Additionally, nothing concerning truth bears on this except
that qua deflationists neopragmatists may claim both that “it is true that the frog is on
the log” and that “it is true that the death penalty is wrong” without any change in the
meaning of “true” and without the need of attaching any controversial metaphysics to
these statements. This deflationary attitude, always criticized by Putnam, ruled out this
potential neopragmatist route as viable for him.
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6. Conclusion
42 Putnam has  been  a  fierce  adversary  of  the  fact/value  dichotomy,  and  this  became
apparent already in the phase when he defended the view called internal realism. He
later changed his main epistemological and metaphysical views by endorsing natural
realism, with the consequence of embracing another view on truth: alethic pluralism,
which  is  the  idea  that  the  truth  predicate  works  differently  in  various  discourse
domains.  Despite  these  changes  of  mind  in  epistemology  and  in  theories  of  truth,
Putnam  continued  criticizing  the  fact/value  dichotomy  as  a  central  aspect  of  his
pragmatist  commitments.  However,  alethic  pluralism entails  distinguishing between
discourse  domains,  especially  between  factual  and  nonfactual  domains,  and  this
distinction is in tension with the rejection of the fact/value dichotomy, as this would
hinder,  by  endorsing  the  entanglement  thesis,  factual  domains  as  genuine.  This
acknowledgment raises compelling doubts concerning the compatibility of these views.
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NOTES
1. Truth is what can “be asserted in epistemically-good-enough-conditions” (Dell’Utri 2017: 7).
2. Bergström (2002) challenges the connection between internal realism and the collapse of the
dichotomy.
3. Putnam 1999. Dell’Utri defines this transition as follows: “Putnam came to realize that this was
not realism enough, beginning his way back to a view in which the independence of the world
from the mind and its theoretical products is more definite” (Dell’Utri 2017: 9). Natural realism,
according to Dell’Utri, must be understood as a kind of “direct realism” as it is called in theory of
perception once we abandon those approaches based on sense data. See Dell’Utri (2017: 10).
4. The locus classicus for this view is Dummett 1978.
5. Other times Putnam seems to embrace, more directly, an anti-metaphysical attitude, to the
point of writing an “obituary” for ontology understood in the fashion of post-Quinean analytic
metaphysics. See Putnam (2004: 71-85).
6. This view was undermined by an argument provided by Wolfgang Künne (2003: 425-52), based
on a version of Frederic Fitch’s paradox of knowability.
7. See Horwich 1998, and Armour-Garb & Beall 2005.
8. As argued by Edwards (2018: 85-6).
9. A  view  like  this  can  be  found  in  Lynch  2013.  See  Wyatt  2013  for  the  specific  problem
motivating such a version of alethic pluralism. For other problems concerning alethic pluralism
see Sainsbury 1996, and Tappolet 1997.
10. See,  for  example,  Angelides  2004,  Bagnoli  2017,  Ben-Menahem 2005,  Bernstein 2005,  and
Scheman 2017 about the dichotomy – but see Bergstrom 2002 and Dall’Agnol 2013 for criticism.
See Pedersen & Wright 2013 for an overview of alethic pluralism. 
11. See Wright 1992,  Lynch 2009.  However,  Lynch recently modified his  pluralist  account by
abandoning the idea of discourse domains. See Lynch 2013. 
12. Even though “correspondence” deserves pride of place for this pluralist account. Dell’Utri
comments on this as follows: “Above all, correspondence may account for some truths, but not all
the truths” (Dell’Utri 2017: 10). So, there is a scope problem for correspondence, and pluralism
mostly enters the scene when correspondence is not tenable: “even if we admit the plausibility of
a correspondentist explanation of the truth of empirical propositions, it turns out to be much
more difficult to apply the same explanation to the truths in ethics, mathematics and the like”
(ibid.).
13. The  later  Wittgenstein  explicitly  avoided  putting  forward  philosophical  theses  and  was
seriously concerned with the legitimacy of philosophical theories which he deemed as pseudo-
theories.  See Wittgenstein (1953: §§124, 126-8).  It  is not by chance, in fact,  that Putnam first
introduced his alethic pluralism in the context of discussing Wittgenstein’s ideas. See Putnam
(1999: 64-70). Stoutland (2019: 77-88) understands Putnam’s latter views on truth as closer to
deflationism (and perhaps to quietism).
14. Dell’Utri talks about “‘scopes’ in which truths can be stated, where the empirical scope is but
one of many” (Dell’Utri 2017: 11).
15. See Price 2013 for an overview of these neopragmatist options. 
16. Putative differences among truths in different domains can be accounted for by pointing out
the differences among the things we talk about: e.g., one between “the frog being on the log” and
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“the death penalty being wrong.” This  is  the Quine-Sainsbury objection to alethic  pluralism,
which naturally supports deflationary perspectives. See Quine 1960 and Sainsbury 1996.
17. Putnam understands subjectivism and relativism as consequences of bad metaphysics and
bad philosophy (the Dichotomy) and seems to read this as the reason why subjectivism is so
popular in our culture. However, I think, with Stephen Turner (2010: 41-7), that the evidence in
support of subjectivism and relativism, as a matter of fact, comes from “diversity”: the fact that
local types and varieties of normativity,  comprising also ethical normativity,  are so different
across the globe and sometimes incompatible with each other. I do not think that philosophy can
be seen as influential as Putnam sees it under this respect. See Bernstein 2005 for a diagnosis
closer to Putnam’s.
18. Or even abandons alethic pluralism in order to maintain the rejection of the dichotomy.
19. See Blackburn 1984, 1993. 
20. See Putnam (2004: 53-5, 83-4).
ABSTRACTS
Hilary Putnam spent much of his career criticizing the fact/value dichotomy, and this became
apparent already during the phase when he defended internal  realism. He later changed his
epistemological and metaphysical view by endorsing natural realism, with the consequence of
embracing alethic pluralism, the idea that truth works differently in various discourse domains.
Despite these changes of mind in epistemology and in theory of truth, Putnam went on criticizing
the  fact/value  dichotomy.  However,  alethic  pluralism  entails  drawing  distinctions  among
discourse domains, especially between factual and nonfactual domains, and these distinctions are
in tension with the  rejection of  the  fact/value dichotomy,  as  this  would in  principle  hinder
factual  domains  as  genuine.  This  issue  raises,  prima  facie,  some  doubts  about  the  effective
compatibility of these views.
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